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Are we asking for more productivity while eroding the integrity that delivers it?⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠

2 days ago
3 min read

We keep asking infrastructure to build more, faster, for less.​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ We rarely ask whether we have made it safe to tell the truth while doing so.

Integrated Delivery means doing what you say you'll do - no excuses!
Integrated Delivery means doing what you say you'll do - no excuses!

Every infrastructure strategy of the last decade makes the same demand.​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ Build more, build faster, spend less. Productivity has become the headline ask, and when a programme slips, the post-mortem reaches for process, technology and skills. It seldom reaches for the human quality that holds all three together: integrity.

Productivity is a promise, and promises need honesty​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠

If productivity means eliminating variance from plan, it depends on two things.​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ The plan must be believed when it is written, and progress must be reported truthfully as the work unfolds. A programme cannot hit a date nobody trusted. It cannot manage a risk nobody admitted. Much of the variance we chase on site began as something a person already knew and did not say.​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠

What the evidence says, and what it does not​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠

Let me be straight about the limits.​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ I have not found a study that puts a number on how much lost productivity comes from a lack of integrity, and I will not invent one. What the research does offer is a pattern worth sitting with.

Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl (2002) examined 258 transport infrastructure projects and concluded that cost underestimation was too systematic to be honest error.​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ They judged strategic misrepresentation the better explanation. Their finding concerns approval rather than delivery, but it shows what happens when winning the work depends on the number being welcome.

Mazar, Amir and Ariely (2008) suggest something gentler and more troubling:​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ most people cheat only as far as they can while still seeing themselves as honest. One replication attempt did not reproduce an experiment from that paper, so hold the idea lightly. It still rings true for anyone who has sat in a commercial meeting.​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ Integrity is rarely lost in one dramatic act. It wears away in small, rational, deniable steps.


Nobody writes “be less honest” into a contract.​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ But a model that punishes early warnings and rewards silence orders exactly that.


Is the system doing it to us?​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠

Here is the question I would put to clients and to the industry.​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ When a commercial model rewards the party that hides risk, wins the claim or protects its margin, what behaviour have we commissioned?

Edmondson (1999) studied 51 work teams and found that where people felt safe to take interpersonal risks, they learned more, and that learning carried through to team performance.​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ That was manufacturing, so we should be careful about transferring it wholesale. The logic travels, though. Where bad news is dangerous, it arrives late.

My view, offered as a view and not a finding:​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ most people on infrastructure programmes are not dishonest. They respond sensibly to the incentives we designed. Then we exhort them to be more productive.

The human element we keep engineering out​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠

Our usual answer to poor delivery is more control:​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ more assurance, more reporting, more data. Some of that is right. But if the data comes from people who fear what it will show, we have built better instruments for measuring a distorted picture. Digital tools cannot restore integrity. They can only reveal whether it is there.​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠

Four questions worth asking tomorrow​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠

  • Does our commercial model pay for early disclosure, or punish it?​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠

  • Who in our supply chain can say “this will not work” without commercial consequence?​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠

  • Do our targets reflect what the programme genuinely believes it can achieve, or what was needed to secure approval?​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠

  • Would we rather hear the bad news this week, or find it in the final account?​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠


Integrity is a design choice

Productivity is not a machine we can tune from the outside.​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ It is the sum of thousands of honest decisions, made by people who trust that honesty will be treated well. If we want infrastructure that delivers to plan, we may need to start by asking whether we have built an industry where telling the truth is the sensible thing to do.​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠


Does your commercial model reward the truth?​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ Black Pear Advisory Ltd works with infrastructure clients to examine what their commercial arrangements actually encourage, and to redesign them for honest, collaborative delivery. Get in touch on +44 7771 865271 or martin@blackpearadvisory.com.



Dr Martin Perks, FRICS, MICW, FQSi | Black Pear Advisory Ltd | 16 November 2026​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠


References

Edmondson, A.​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ (1999) ‘Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2), pp. 350-383.

Flyvbjerg, B., Holm, M.K.S.​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ and Buhl, S.L. (2002) ‘Underestimating costs in public works projects: error or lie?’, Journal of the American Planning Association, 68(3), pp. 279-295.

Mazar, N., Amir, O.​‌​‌​​​‌​⁠⁠⁠‍​⁠⁠‌‌⁠​⁠​‌⁠​‍​‌​‌⁠⁠ and Ariely, D. (2008) ‘The dishonesty of honest people: a theory of self-concept maintenance’, Journal of Marketing Research, 45(6), pp. 633-644.

 
 
 

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